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Abstract 
We present preliminary results of 1086 structured interviews about price setting behavior of 
the formal firms in the manufacturing and services sector of Pakistan. Our key discoveries are 
that frequency of price change is considerably high in Pakistan, lowering the real impact of 
monetary policy. Price rigidity is explained mainly by firms caring about relative prices and 
the persistence of a given shock. The exchange rate and cost shocks are more important than 
financial and demand shocks for both setting prices and also the readiness with which these 
pass-through to the economy. Large firms change prices more frequently compared to smaller 
firms. Formal sector firms, especially medium sized firms, interact more with informal sector 
firms through the demand and supply channels. Formal firms highly connected with the 
informal sector have lower frequency of price changes. Formal sector firms hold lack of taxes 
and compliance with tax regime, i.e. enforcement, as the main reasons for the existence of the 
informal sector. 
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1. Introduction
The idea of sticky prices is at the heart of modern day macroeconomics for explaining economic uc-
tuations over the short horizon. It implies that instead of being vertical the aggregate supply curve is
upward sloping. Therefore, uctuations in aggregate demand can cause uctuations in output. This setup
is fundamental for monetary policy as it determines the extent to which money growth, with its inuence
on aggregate demand, can inuence the real economy. As it is commonly implied that lengthier the pe-
riod between price changes the greater the inuence of monetary policy. Therefore it is quintessential to
empirically establish the extent and the nature of sticky prices.
Until recently there had been a gap between theoretical explanations of price-stickiness and studies of
their empirical importance. Partly in response to this gap and partly because of the apparent success over
the last two decades of monetary policy in curbing ination, central bankers and academics of advanced
economies have devoted much resources to empirical study of price stickiness1 . To name a few studies
Rotemberg (1982), Carlton (1986), Cecchetti (1986), Kashyap (1995), Blinder (1991), Blinder et al. (1998),
Taylor (1999), Aspland, Eriksson and Freiberg (2000), Hall, Walsh and Yates (2000), Bils and Klenow
(2004), Levy, Datta and Bergen (2002), Amirault et al. (2005) and more recently Fabiani et al. (2007) and
Nakamura and Steisson (2008). This large literature for U.S. and European countries shows that the degree
of price-stickiness is considerable and pricing strategies are complicated.
However, the corresponding e¤ort to study price-stickiness in developing economies leaves much to be
desired. Such a study is all the more important in light of the growing literature that documents for the
contrasting features of the developing world such as: (i) procyclical monetary policies, (ii) persistence of
ination levels in the double-digits and (iii) higher than average volatilities of annualized ination rates (see
especially Agénor and Montiel (2010) and Frankel (2010) and the literature therein). Furthermore, with
the expected rise of the emerging markets as world economic engines it will become increasingly important
to study in detail the behavior of their product markets and the extent to which they di¤er from that of the
developed world.
In this paper, we present results of 1086 face-to-face structured interviews carried out in 2009 & 2010 with
entrepreneurs representing the formal rms in the manufacturing and services sector of Pakistan. By formal
it is meant that our rms are o¢ cially registered, tax liable and also report data to employment agencies.
Therefore, these rms necessarily take part in the o¢ cial GDP and employment statistics. This study is
comparable to similar research work in developed countries in that key questions were benchmarked and
drawn from the pioneering works by Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. (1998) for the U.S. and Fabiani et al
(2007) for the Euro area. The interviewers inquired about the nature of the product market, frequency of price
reviews and price changes, key explanation for price-stickiness, dissemination of economic shocks, and the
nature of interaction with the informal sector entrepreneurs. Understanding the linkages with the informal
sector is important given that in Pakistan informal economy2 employs more than 70% of non-agricutural
labor force 3 .
To the authorsknowledge, features of current survey such as the scale of structured interviews (only
Blinder et al. (2007) for US, Amirault et al. (2005) for Canada and to a smaller extent Loupias and Ricart
(2004) for France used structured interviews), sectoral coverage, updated list of price theories and questions
on the informal sector makes it the rst exercise of its kind jointly conducted by the central bank and the
statistical agencies of Pakistan. Furthermore, this study is a good test for the universality of a great number
of price theories developed by economists over the last two decades.
A few words on the macroeconomic situation of Pakistan at the time of the interviews (Dec 2009-Dec
2010) before the presentation of key results. In November 2008, Pakistan entered a 23 month IMF program
(the 11th since 1988) after a balance-of-payments crisis in May 2008. The average annualized ination rates
for Pakistan during the three months of the interviews in Punjab was 12.5%, and ve months of survey
in Sindh was 14%; which is 4-6% above Pakistans 50 year trend. During the scal year 2010 (i.e. July
1For example, the European Central Bank has a large team working under the ageis of  Ination Persistence Networkto
study prices.
2with its output evaluated at least one-third of reported GDP (see Arby, Hanif and Malik (2010))
3Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2009-10.
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2009-June 2010) real GDP was projected to grow at 4% and the annual unemployment rate was 5.5%4 .
Monetary policy was conducted under a dirty-oat with an implicit ination and growth rate targets of 9%
and 3.3% respectively.
We establish eleven stylized facts about price-setting behavior in Pakistans formal manufacturing and
services sectors and compare them with Fabiani et al. (2007) where possible:
Fact 1. The median frequency of price changes in the manufacturing and services sector is 4 and 2 times
a year respectively. The equivalent gures are 1 and 1.4 times a year in Europe and US respectively. This
result translates to at least one-quarter of Pakistans GDP being repriced 3 times a year.
Fact 2. Formal rms are relatively more sensitive and promptly accommodate to changes in (a) overall
cost in particular that of energy and intermediate inputs, (b) exchange rate and (c) competitorsprices.
However changes in demand and nancial-costs matter less. This is consistent with previous literature for
developed countries with the main di¤erence being that labor costs relative to energy costs were found to
be more relevant for them;
Fact 3. Time dependent price rules are more common than state-dependent ones, with 51% of rms
using the former; while for developed economies the same gure was 33% ;
Fact 4. The top three reasons for delaying price changes upwards are: (a) the fear that other rms will
not follow (b) the uncertainty that shocks might be temporary and (c) the fear of customer retaliation. The
rst and the third reasons are in line with the results from developed economies;
Fact 5. 32% of owners reported that prices are benchmarked to competitors price, while 54% reported
setting prices on the basis of constant or variable markup. The same gures stand at 27% and 52% re-
spectively for developed countries. However, there is considerable imperfect competition in all types of
economies;
Fact 6. The manufacturing sectorwhere costs of raw material account for 56% of total costresponds
more to cost shocks relative to the services sectorwhere labor costs account for 40% of total cost;
Fact 7. All rms, big or small, use backward and forward-looking information sets in making price
decisions. In particular, 53% of rms use a combination of backward and forecast information while only
19% use pure forecasts. In contrast, the use of forecast information is considerably higher in developed
countries with 55% of rms relying on it;
The remaining facts are particular to the linkages between formal and informal sector as viewed by formal
sector entrepreneurs:
Fact 8. 46.8% of formal rms interviewed interact with the informal sector either through demand or
supply channels;
Fact 9. Economies of scale, customer preferences and market power motivates formal rms to remain in
the formal sector;
Fact 10. According to formal rms, tax exemptions and weak enforcement are the main reasons for the
existence of informal sector;
Fact 11. Formal rms with frequent interaction with the informal sector tend to have relatively lower
frequency of price change suggesting that interactions with informal economy serve as shock absorbers.
This paper is organised in the following way. Sections 2 and 3 discuss sampling issues and how business-
men reacted to our interviews. Sections 4-7 discuss various aspects of pricing. Section 8 presents the caveats
of our study while a nal Section concludes.
2. The Research Design
Generally, there are three approaches to obtaining information on price stickiness at the rm level: (i)
using secondary data from which one may infer stickiness (ii) sending surveys through e-mail or post (iii)
conducting one-on-one structured interviews. The rst approach has the concern that data on economic
outcomes is not su¢ ciently detailed in Pakistan at the rm level for a meaningful study on prices. The second
approach has the concern that unlike in western countries, the concept of obtaining qualitative information
through e-mail and post is relatively new in Pakistan which might lead to low response rates. Also, there is
4The uno¢ cial unemployment rates are higher but they are hard to assess as 70% of the typical non-agricultural household 0s
working hour are spent in the informal sector.
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no guarantee that the survey would be lled by a suitable person in the organization. The main concern for
the third approach is that it is costly (especially for large sample size like ours) and the length of the survey
process may be longer.
However, we decided to adopt structured interviews approach for our survey mainly for three reasons:
complexity of questionnaire, potential poor response rate through traditional mail and fear that questionnaire
might not reach the appropriate person. Lower response rate does not necessarily indicate any bias, especially
if distributed systematically across sample. We have lower response from large rms as in other surveys such
as Kwapil et al. (2005) and Loupias and Ricart (2004), our post stratication scheme for rmssize and
economic activity in manufacturing sector reduced this bias. Despite the higher cost, face-to-face interviews
are considered to produce higher quality results and a higher response rate. They also reduce the possibility
of uke answers, provide direct access to the suitable individual and allow interviewers to carry out a longer
list of queries. On balance, structured face-to-face interviews approach appeared most suitable for our
survey.
Overall, the literature recognizes the potential of Blinders unorthodox survey approach. Indeed, no less
than 17 developed countries have used impersonal questionnaires (via e-mail or post) to study the pricing
pattern5 in the manufacturing and services sectors. Nonetheless, with all qualitative surveys (structured
interviews or otherwise) there is the danger of misinterpretation by respondents with the slightest change
in the wording of the questions leading to disproportionate responses. In many cases respondents may use
intuition rather than what they do in practice to respond to the questions.
In full recognition of the possibility that these challenges might be more acute for a developing country,
we teamed up with statistical agencies of Pakistan. They selected experienced interviewers with local know-
how and contacts to conduct our survey. The State Bank provided focused training (both theoretical and
practical) to the interviewers for complex real world situations, where they need to elaborate and explain
the questions for clarity. State Bank also conducted two separate pilots before launching the study. For a
further quality check, economists from the State Bank randomly audited 10% of live interviews.
The face-to-face interviews took place between December 2009 and December 2010. The study began
in Punjab in December 2009 and ended in March 2010. In Sindh, it was launched in June 2010 and ended
in November 2010 (for manufacturing only). The services sector interviews in Sindh are currently ongoing.
2.1. The Questionnaire
The questionnaire is benchmarked to Blinder (1991) and the collection of studies in Fabiani et al. (2007).
This is imperative as it allows us to draw parallels between developing and developed economies. In line with
previous work, section A of our questionnaire contains questions on the general prole of the rm as well as
queries on the types of customer and the nature of competition in their respective market. Section B, C, and
D contain questions on various aspects of price setting of the main productone with highest domestic sales.
Section E contains queries on existing theories of price-stickiness and dissemination of shocks. Section F
contains queries on the interlinkages between formal and informal sector.
In order to better capture the ground realities of Pakistani economy, the questionnaire was customized in
following ways: First, we asked formal rms about their interactions and views on informal sector. Second,
we asked entrepreneurs to provide us with a breakdown of their cost structure. Third, in the section on
price-dissemination we paid particular attention to the e¤ects of external shocks on prices. Indeed, Pakistan
is exceptionally vulnerable to external shocks with 11 IMF programmes since 19886 . This is important as
little is known about shock transmission in developing countries at the micro level.
On testing side, the newly designed questionnaire was tested between ourselves and crucially on a separate
sample of 50 randomly selected rms in Karachi. Subsequent to these trials, we rephrased and re-sequenced
certain questions to improve comprehension and uidity of the interviews. The nal questionnaire was then
translated into the local language. (selected questions from questionnaire are are attached in Appendix B).
5The U.S. used structured interviews.
6See www.imf.org.
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2.2. Sampling
In collaboration with the statistical bureaus of Sindh and Punjab7 , we covered the formalmanufacturing
and services sector in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The other two provinces of the country (Balochistan
and Khyber-Pakhtun Khwa) were avoided due to safety reasons at the time of the interviews. Our focus on
the lager provinces and sectors ensures that our results are a good representative of the pricing pattern of
formal sector in Pakistan.
Table 1 provide details of the sample. As of November 2010, 1086 structured interviews were completed.
Of these interviews, 980 are from the manufacturing sector with 243 (that is 25%) out of 980 from the
Sindh province. The services sector accounted for 10% of the sample but this fraction will rise given the
ongoing interviews in Sindh. In practice, most of the price setting surveys in Euro area are biased towards
industry, due to the nature of price survey. Our bias towards manufacturing sector is not misleading when
one considers that the o¢ cial consumer price index in Pakistan, is skewed towards tangible over non-tangible
goods with the former contributing 56.6% and the latter contributing 23.1% respectively to the CPI basket8 .
We now discuss the sampling methodology of the manufacturing sector followed by that of the services sector.
The frame for the manufacturing sector was provided by Bureau of Statistics which was the primary
source of information for our sample selection. This frame consists of all the rms that have reported in
the last cencus of manufacturing industries (CMI). The manufacturing sector is dominated by certain type
of economic activities as well as having a greater share of small sized rms. Therefore, a purely random
sample would run the risk of having a biased sample towards these activities and rms. To overcome this
problem, stratied random sampling was used. The rms were stratied on the basis of economic activity
and rm size. The manufacturing sample covers rms with economic activity codes from 15 to 36 (excluding
30) according to Pakistan Standard Industrial Classication (PSIC)9 . These economic activities are in line
with International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC). The population of rms for above mentioned
sub-sectors of manufacturing sector was split into three categories of employment brackets: 10- 50, 51-250
and more than 250 employees. On the basis of these classications, a random sample for manufacturing
sector was drawn from 63 mutually exclusive strata. We drew a sample of 1200 rms for the manufacturing
sector in Sindh and Punjab, along with a replacement-sample representing 50% of the original sample was
also drawn to cover the possibility of non-response. In case of non-response, a rm from a particular stratum
was replaced by another rm from the same stratum to maintain sectoral representation.
The sampling for services sector is more complicated in that there is no population frame of rms in
services sector easily available to us. Therefore, we used the database of Securities and Exchange Commission
of Pakistan (SECP) which maintains a complete list of rms registered with them. However, the SECP
frame lacks information on rm size and dormant or non-dormant status of rms. Therefore, we imposed
following constraints on the sample selection in the services sector. First, to minimize the chance of selecting
dormant rms from a massive database, we only selected rms that had been registered within the last 10
years and if registered before that time period have reported to SECP at least once in the last 10 years10 .
Second, to avoid small rm bias, only rms with paid-up capital more than RS. 2,000,000 (USD 23500)
were selected in our sample . Third, we only included rms involved in economic activities where it is
possible to clearly identify their main service. A random sample of 270 rms was selected from transport
and telecommunication, hotels and restaurants, education and health care services on the basis of sectoral
distribution. With above limitations, results for services sector should be interpreted very carefully as they
only reect price-setting behavior for selected services and not from a well-dened sample frame.
7These agencies are well-equipped for this exercise as they conduct the census of the manufacturing sector in Pakistan
8The remaining account for rent in the CPI basket.
9The activities are: 15-(food products & beverages), 16-(tobacco products), 17-(manufacture of textiles), 18-(wearing ap-
parel), 19-(leather products), 20-(wood & wood products), 21-(paper & paper products), 22-(publishing, printing & reproduc-
tion), 23-(petroleum), 24-(chemicals & chemical products), 25-(rubber & plastics products), 26-(other non-metallic mineral
products), 27-(basic metals), 28-(fabricated metal products), 29-(machinery & equipment N.E.C.), 31-(electrical machinery &
apparatus N.E.C.), 32-(radio, TV & communication equipment), 33-(medical & optical instruments), 34-(motor vehicles &
trailers), 35-(other transport equipment), 36-(furniture).
10Every rm registered with SECP has the obligation to report its statistics on annual basis but few do so on regular basis
Formal Sector Price Discoveries: Preliminary Results from a Developing Country 6
Figure 1: Comparison of Percentage Shares of Small, Medium and Large Firms in Population, Sample and
Survey Respondents in Manufacturing Sector
Table 1. The Sample
Manufacturing Services Total
Small 555 69 624
Medium 269 24 293
Large 169 13 182
Total 980 106 1086
Sindh Representation 25% 0%
a. Position as November 2010
A few thoughts on the sample size before we discuss the results. The sample size of 1086 manufacturing
and services sector rms makes our survey the fth largest price survey among the existing European and
U.S. surveys. Also, to best of authors knowledge this survey is rst of its kind for an emerging economy
like Pakistan. The covered sample of 980 rms in the manufacturing sector is about 9 % of the target
population, which is well above the usual convention of choosing a sample of about 5 % of the population.
However, sample for the services sector was selected as a small proportion of a pseudo-sample because of
non-availability of any formal frame. In order to make sure that the sample was well representative of the
population, we allocated the sample according to strata shares in population. However, for strata with very
small share in population, sample size was deliberately increased to be able to make stronger statistical
inference for them. The allocated sample was then drawn randomly from sample frames. For very small
stratum, we included all of the rms from such strata in our sample.
To draw valid inferences for population on the basis of this sample, it was necessary to post-stratify
the data to control for possible selection biases due to either closure of some selected rms, rms being
sole-exporter of their product or rms shifting to new economic activity. Similarly, large rmsdecisions are
likely to be more important but we had low response rate from larger rms so data needed to be adjusted for
rm size as well. Following Kwapil et al (2005) and Martins (2005) for Austria and Portugal, manufacturing
sector weights were redened to sub-sector of economic activity and size of rm. The weight wh represents
the weights of hth stratum
wh =
Ph
P
Sh
S
Formal Sector Price Discoveries: Preliminary Results from a Developing Country 7
where, Ph is the number of employees in the population in stratum h, P is the total number of employees
in the population. Similarly, Sh is the number of employees in the rms interviewed in stratum h and S is
total number of employees in all the responding rms.
For services sector, the information set available was not enough to post-stratify in parallel with the
manufacturing sector. Therefore, responses for the services sector in this paper are reported only by weighting
it to base stratum weight (NhN ), where Nh is the number of rms in stratum h and N is total number of
rms in the population:
The above individual weighing schemes for the manufacturing and services sectors do not account for their
share in the economy. This means that to make inferences about price-setting for the aggregate economy,
especially for those results11 that can be aggregated, we must reweigh the results on the basis of economy-
wide sector weights on the basis of Table 2. We poststratied the data of manufacturing and services sector
by their respective weights in population, these results are reported under totalin our subsequent analysis.
Generally, manufacturing and services sectors combined accounted for 71.4% of GDP in 2009. How-
ever, taking only into consideration the subsectors that are covered in our interviews, our nal sample is
representative of decisions-makers that produce 25.227 % of GDP. The under-representation of services
sector is noticeable but common in other international price related studies as well. This is because it is
not straight forward to dene the main product for some services sector rms. Services like nancial ser-
vices, construction, retail and trade were not included where product usually changes with every transaction.
Also, in our case the sample frame for the services sector was not available. Given the list of subsectors
in the manufacturing and the services sectors, on aggregate we believe to have captured a true picture of
price-settingin Pakistan with identiable products.
Table 2. The Overall Representation
Manufacturing Services Total
% GDP in Pakistan 2009 18.3 53.1 71.4
% of GDP represented by our sample 12.2 13-15 25.2-27
% of sector in our sample 90 10 100
% Replacement 18.3 19.8 18.4
3. Businesses Reaction
Firm owners in developing countries are reluctant to come into contact with government agencies due to
mistrust and the potential of extortion from government o¢ cials.
To overcome this concern we rst convinced Chambers of Commerce in Lahore and Karachi and the
Ministry of Industries to endorse our project and let our interviewers use their blessing when contacting
selected rms. Second, we ensured that each rm was interviewed by a well-prepared senior interviewer.
Third, each interview was preceded by providing a full guarantee that data collected will reside only in
the hands of the State Bank and only results at an aggregate level will be released. Fourth, the Central
Banks emphasis and desire to understand the blackbox of business decision-making were explained with the
option of contacting the higher authorities of the State Bank at the time of interviews. Finally, we provided
personal appreciation letters on the behalf of the Governor of the State Bank at the end of the study.
Once the rm owners were convinced about the objectives of the study we found them to be frank and
appreciative of the initiative taken by the SBP to connect with the ground realities of rm-level decision
making. As in the case of Blinder (1991), we also found rms eager to open a dialogue with the Central Bank
and talk openly about sensitive issues such as their cost and demand structures and their interaction with
the informal economy. On one memorable occasion, the interviewers were presented with ination forecasts
based on sound econometrics! In majority of the cases, interviews were conducted once the company bosses
had agreed to be interviewed. In a few cases, we were asked to leave our questionnaire behind and come
11Note that not at all questions can be aggregated since they may simply be sector specic . For example costs breakdown
in manufacturing sector are naturally di¤erent from that of services sector and therefore can not be aggregated. Similarly, cost
specic shocks and their ramications for pricing can not aggregated in a sensible way.
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back to conduct the interview at a later date. The longest interview lasted three hours only because the
company owner was eager to participate in the interview and interact with our economist.
4. The Environment
To a great extent price determination and its adjustment depends on the market structure. The struc-
tured interview approach addressed this issue by asking about rm size, importance of the main product for
the rm, rms position in the market, and the quality of rms relationship with customers.
The questions focused on the dominant product of a given rm in terms of turnover in Pakistan . In
manufacturing and services sector we found turnover generated by main product to be 76 % and 85 % re-
spectively. Furthermore, national market was the main market for 92% of manufacturing and services sectors
rms for their main product in our sample. This implies that our survey reults present a representative
picture of pricing pattern at the rm level in Pakistan. This suits our needs as we are primarily interested
in understanding the pricing-pattern in Pakistan. International penetration of the main product in Pakistan
is at least three times lower compared to the Euro zone.
Table 3. Market and Competition of the Main Product
Manufacturing Services Euro Zone Averagea
Reference Market
i. International 8 8 27
ii. Local Market (City and Surrounding Areas) 28 33
iii. National Market excluding (ii). 64 60
iv. ii+iii 92 92 73
% Turnover in Pakistan
41-60 16 13
61-80 29 13
81-100 44 67
Market Share
Top rm 8 17
Top four rms 18 18
Top ten rms 23 21
Not among the top 10 rms 50 44
Main Customer and long-term relationship
Other Firms 79 34 75
Customers 19 60 21
Public Sector 2 7 3
All long term relationships 57 42 70
Perceived Degree of Competition
Very High 50 48 26
High 26 33 35
Medium 20 13 21
Weak 4 7 17
a: Weighted by countrys GDP in Fabiani et al. (2007).
As for the interaction with customers, majority (79% on average) of manufacturing sector rms sell their
main product to other rms. While in services sector 60% of the rms directly deal with nal customers.
This implies that the results of our interviews refer to producers prices for the manufacturing sector and
customer prices for the services sector. European and U.S. price surveys have found very similar features.
Furthermore, for rms in our sample majority of customers (57% manufacturing and 42% services) tend to
be repeat customers. However, the share of repeat customers in our sample of Pakistani rms is less than
Europe, where 70% of sales are based on long-term clients.
Table 3 eludes to the degree of competition in manufacturing and services sectors. Majority of rms
perceive that market competition is high or very high in the industry. The share of rms claiming to operate
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in a weak or very weak competition is 24% and 20% for manufacturing and services sector respectively.
This implies that markets are more competitive in Pakistan than in Euro zone where 40% of rms perceive
competition to be weak. This nding is further corroborated by the fact that 50% and 40% of rms in
manufacturing and services sector respectively place themselves not to be amongst the top ten rms.
In sum, one infers from the empirical evidence that there is a monopolistic environment in Pakistan with
rms usually having long-term relationship with customers. However, this environment is more competitive
than Europe and the proportion of rms with long-term relationship with customers is smaller. The impli-
cation is that Pakistan should have a lower degree of price rigidity compared to developed countries, which
is precisely what we turn to next.
5. A Prole of Price Setting
Most keyensian economists believe that the slow adjustment in prices and wages play an important role
for explaining economic uctuations. However, there is an alternative view of New-classical economists
who argue that prices are exible, even in the short-run, and that explanations for economic uctuations
must be found elsewhere in factors such as technology shocks and preferences. These two di¤ering views
fundamentally a¤ect the choice of the critical assumption of perfect vs. imperfect competition in product
and labor markets for the purpose of building representative model of the economy. Therefore, it is essential
to get a solid empirical grasp on the extent and the nature of price and wage stickiness in Pakistan. This
section is devoted to price-setting behavior of rms in our sample, namely, the basis on which prices are
set, revised and their frequencies.12 In previous section, we found indications of imperfect competition in
Pakistan. This result is further consolidated by the nding in Table 4 that 38% and 71% of rms in
the manufacturing and services sectors reported applying the markup rule of pricing. Overall, 54% of our
representative decision-makers that produce one-quarter of GDP use the markup rule. Surprisingly, the
word markupis commonly used in Pakistan to denote unit prot margin in local-language . A further 45%
and 18% of manufacturing and services sector rms reported following their competitors in setting prices.
Overall, the numbers are not too di¤erent from the results in Europe, with the main di¤erence being the use
of markup rule in services sector in Pakistan is relatively higher, which implies that prices should change
with greater frequency in the manufacturing sector.
Table 4. Price Rules
Pakistan Euro Zone
Markupa
Manufacturing 38 58
Services 71 43
Total 54 51
Competitors Price
Manufacturing 45 38
Services 18 57
Total 32 48
Otherb
Manufacturing 17 4
Services 11 0
Total 14 2
a: Include markups that are constant and variables
including those to customers
b: Include prices determined by association and the
government.
These results rmly establish the existence of imperfect competition in Pakistan and hence that rms set
prices themselves. The feature to establish next are the foundations of price reassessments. To establish
12We deal with wage-stickiness in a separate paper.
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these features we ignore prices determined by government. The academic literature identies three methods
of evaluation: (i) at regular time interval (ii) on the basis of specic events and (iii) a combination of the
former two. Formally, the rst two modes are known as time-dependent and state-dependent pricing rules
respectively. In the case of former the time-interval may be xed as in the staggered-price model of Taylor
(1980) and Calvo (1983). In the case of the latter, a large di¤erence between original and optimal price
triggers rms to change prices as in Barro (1972), Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) and Caplin and Leahy (1997).
It is also possible for rms to mix both methods of price adjustment. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect rms
to accommodate for specic changes even when they generally adhere to a time interval for price changes;
this idea was rst debated in Hall et al. (2000) then further taken by Apel et al. (2005).
In Table 5, estimated weighted average of rms that review their prices at regular time-intervals is 51%
and a further 10% of rms review generally at regular time intervals, while also accommodating for specic
events. This implies that 61% of the rm change prices on the basis of time-dependent rules. These numbers
are similar to Blinder et al. (1998) for US and Hall et al. (2000) for UK where the gures are 60% and
70% respectively. In contrast, European gures from Fabiani et al. (2007) of 34% and for Sweden of
44.8% in Apel et al. (2005) are far lower. This di¤erence may be due to their market structure with a
signicantly higher proportion of long term customers and also the fact that Sweden and Euro zone had lower
inationary environment at the time of their surveys. Therefore, for rms in their sample prices reviews
were only necessary on specic occasions. In the case of Pakistan, 50 year trend ination of 8% implies
that it is imperative for rms to reassess prices more regularly. Table 5 also provides a breakdown for the
manufacturing and services sectors, and rm size. Note that both sectors are similar in the way prices are
reviewed. Moreover, the rm size is positively correlated with regular price reviewing.
Table 5. Price Assessments (% of responses)
Pakistan Euro Zone
Purely Time-Dependent
Manufacturing 50 32
Services 52
Total 51 34
Purely State-Dependent
Manufacturing 28
Services 22
Total 25
Generally Time-Dependent but also Event Based
Manufacturing 13 46
Services 6
Total 10 46
Purely Time-Dependent
Small 46
Medium 62
Large 65
We now turn our attention to measures of prices stickiness. This is crucial as it determines the extent
to which monetary policy can have real impact on the economy. As discussed earlier, frequent changes
in prices lower the length of price spells by making the aggregate supply curve steeper. In Table 6, we
discuss the key measure of price-stickiness by directly asking entrepreneurs about their actual number of
price changes in a typical year. The median13 number of price changes in Pakistan is three times a year for
at least one quarter of its GDP. This is almost 3 times what is found in the developed world. This implies
that median spell of a price change is 4 months. Furthermore, 32.5% of the rms change their prices within
a month; a number twice as large as the Euro zone and one and half times greater than what is found in
studies on the US. We also discover in Table 6, that at disaggregated level, manufacturing sector prices are
13The mean would be a misleading measure of central tendency as some rms change their prices on continuous basis. For
these rms we assume that prices change on daily basis to simplify our analysis.
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twice as more exible than prices in the services sector and rm size positively impacts the median frequency
of price changes. This implies that for manufacturing goods the duration of price spells is no longer than
three months. The latter results are also found in the developed economies but their signicance is not as
sharp. It is also noticeable that small rms and large rms have similar median number of price changes.
An explanation for this fact is provided by anecdotal evidence that smaller rms tend to closely follow larger
competitors for changing prices in Pakistan.
Table 6.Actual Price Changes
Total Pakistan Euro Zone US
Median Number of Price Changes in a Year 3 1 1.4
Implied Median Spell of Price Change in Monthsa 4 12 8.6
% of Firms that Change Price Within a Month 32.5 15.9 20.9
Quarterly Calvo Probabilities using Median Durationb 0:25 0.75 0.65
% of Firms that Review their Prices With a Month 70 26 26
Median Price Change per Year
Manufacturing Sector 4
Services Sector 2
Small 3
Medium 2
Large 3
a: This is ratio of 12 and median of number of price changes in a year.
b: The probability that rms do not re-optimize the prices they charge during a quarter
In sum, there are price rigidities in Pakistan but far less than what is found in developed economies.
There is higher degree of price rigidity in the services sector compared to the manufacturing sector. Large
rms change prices more frequently than medium rms. Finally, rms facing lower competition change their
prices less frequently. These results may also be conrmed by running a simple cross-section regression with
price-frequencies on the left-hand-side and a host of explanatory variables on the right-hand-side (see Apel
et al (2005)). Howewer to minimise space we deal with this technical analysis in a separate paper.
The empirical evidence presented on price stickiness with higher frequency of price change, have important
implications for policy-making in Pakistan. First, monetary policy would have smaller impact on real
economy than found in an environment with lower frequency of price change. This happens because a
smaller proportion of rms will have their actual prices di¤erent from the optimal levels. This implies that
prices are fully reoptimized within a short-period of time giving the policy maker a very small window of
opportunity to a¤ect output.
To reiterate this point further, let us make the unlikely assumption that all features of the Pakistani
economy resemble that of the U.S. economy with the exception of di¤erent frequency of price change as in
Table 6. We plug this information in a simple quarterly Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model of U.S. In our version, nominal price rigidity is the only source of friction with other standard
ingredients of monopolistic competition in the product market, monetary policy and balanced budget. In
Fig. 2, we present the impact of a one standard-deviation interest rate shock on the output gap. The real
impact of a policy shock on output for Pakistan is smaller with the brunt of its e¤ect dying out within three
quarters. While on the other hand for the US case output falls 15% below its potential and e¤ects of policy
shock dying out only after the 17th quarter. This simple exercise goes to show that using the assumption
of nominal price-rigidity to explain economic uctuations and persistence in real variables in Pakistan may
not be the best idea.
Second, the higher frequency of price changes calls for policy-making and analysis to be based on data that
is at a frequency better than quarterly and quarterly at worst. This is conrmed by the Calvo probabilities
in Table 6 which show that prices are optimized by a quarter.
Third, the nding that time-dependent rules are also applicable to high-frequency price changing economies
with relatively high ination has not been documented previously in the literature to our knowledge. The
potential reason behind the puzzle is the frequency of price reviews. Price review within a month is the
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Figure 2: The impact of an interest-rate shock on the output gap (y   y):
most common practice in the Pakistani markets, where for US and Euro area the same proportion is only
one quarter of the rms. The time dependent rms with very high frequency of price reviews indicate that
despite the time dependent rule, the probability of reoptimizing prices increases with signicant di¤erences
between original and optimal prices. The behavior of such rm is likely to resemble state dependent rms.
Note that our pattern of pricing appears not to be conditioned by the choice of year as the rms provided
similar answers to what they actually did in 2008 and 2009.
These results naturally raise an important question for developing economies such as Pakistan. Models
based on time-dependent rules with fairly low frequency of aggregate price change and where these changes
are staggered are the mainstay of monetary economics for explaining persistence in ination and output.
To see how, consider the following example. Imagine every rm in Pakistan change prices on an agreed
date, let say the rst day of each month. In this environment, if the central bank increases money supply
to boost aggregate demand in the middle of the month then output will be higher until prices are revised
(that is the rst day of the following month) at which point the boom will end. Now imagine, rms do not
revise prices on the same date but stagger them over the year. In this scenario, when a typical rm owner
is "due" for a price change, the jump will be smaller because he realizes that not everyone is expected to
change price and as a result fears losing customers. Other rms will also act similarly and go for smaller
price jumps with the result that relative prices will move slowly. The implication of such behavior by rms
is that a monetary policy shock will have a long-lasting e¤ect on output and such price staggering will lead
to price levels rising slowly.
The question now is the extent to which this approach is valid for Pakistan? Not so valid according to
results of this study. Pakistan reprices its GDP more frequently and therefore nominal-rigidity feature is
unlikely to apply completely. A puzzle then emerges for policymakers and researchers alike. Given that
policy can not fully impact the real sector or in other words ination-growth tradeo¤ is weak, how does one
explain persistence of ination in Pakistan? We call this the persistence-puzzle and shed some light on it
later.
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We have already learnt that rms in Pakistan change prices not continuously but more frequently than
rms in developed countries, but what stops them from changing prices even more frequently. To answer
this question we presented rms with an extensive list of statements, based on a manifold of theories, and
asked them to identify the ones that were used in the practical sense for delaying price adjustments.
Table 7A Reason for Price Stickiness
Theories Description Pakistan Europe US
Manufacturing Services
Coordination Failure Firms watch what other rms will
do rst
1 1 4 1
Temporary Shocks Firms avoid price changes if they
perceive a shock (demand or sup-
ply) to be transitory
2 4 5
Risking Customer Rela-
tions
Customer might take the price
change as exploitative and antag-
onize
3 3 11
Procyclical Elasticities When times are good customers
become more price sensitive
4 6 6
Habit Formation When times are good share
of non-habitual customers with
higher price elasticities increases
5 5
Constant Unit Cost When unit cost is constant, price
markups do not change
6 8 3 2
Delivery Time Firms vary delivery lags before
they make price adjustment
7 14
Explicit Contracts Prices are xed for a time interval
by contract
8 2 2 3
External Financing In good times external nancing
is cheaper allowing markups to be
constant
9 10 7
Using Inventories Firms vary inventories to avoid
price adjustments
10 15 7 8
Thick Markets In good times the ratio of re-
lationship costs to output sold
is lower allowing rms to keep
markups constant
11 7
Informal Sector Coordina-
tion Failure
Firms watch what competing
rms in the informal sector would
do
12 9
Implicit Contracts Firms have invisible agreement to
maintain prices at a certain level
13 11 1 4
Costly Information Gath-
ering
Firms incur cost of acquiring in-
formation that would allow them
to adjust prices
14 12 9
Menu Costs Firms incur cost of adjusting
prices
15 13 8 4
1: In US rms were asked, out of freewill, to cite what in general stopped them from
changing prices and the largest majority said customers antagonism.
Firms were asked to evaluate the importance of di¤erent pricing theories for their pricing decisions on the
scale of: very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant. The responses were coded from
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1 to 4 respectively. The responses for the manufacturing and services sector were used to rank di¤erent
theories. In Table 7A, we present the results of the manufacturing sector and the services sector. For
comparison, we also present the results from U.S. and Euro zone surveys.
The top three explanations for delaying price adjustment are: (i) rms prefer to act once they have
observed how their peers behave (83% of the rms ranking this aspect important or better) i.e. rms care
about relative prices (ii) the perception that shocks might be of temporary nature (46% of the rms ranking
this aspect important or very important) and (iii) the fear of customer retaliation (47% of the rms ranking
this aspect important or very important). Generally, our results are closer to the US than the Euro zone,
Hall et al.(2000) for UK and Apel et al.(2005) for Sweden. This should be expected given that median
frequency of price change in the US is relatively higher than elsewhere. The ideas of implicit contracts,
costly price adjustments and costly information appear at the bottom of our ranking. The latter two theories
performed especially badly in other surveys as well. For details of mean scores, refer to Table 7B in Appendix
A.
We also asked rm owners separately if any of the relevant theories in Table 7A hindered them from
marking down prices. In response, the top two explanations stayed the same as in Table 7A. However a
di¤erent theory was ranked third (with 46% of rms choosing it) and it is that rms refrain from reducing
prices during bad times as it hurts their liquidity positions.
These results are reasonable for Pakistan considering its higher frequency of price changes. For example,
it is hard to imagine a formal price-agreement or costs associated with collecting information in the manu-
facturing sector, where the typical price duration is only 3 months. However, in the services sector where
the median price change is twice a year, explicit contracts make more sense and were also reported as the
second most mentioned reason for price stickiness.
6. Factors Determining Price Adjustment
There are four key ingredients of price determination. First, what drives price changes. Second,
di¤erences in rm behavior when prices go up as opposed to when they go down. Third, the speed with
which di¤erent shocks are incorporated into prices. Fourth, the type of information used during the decision
making. We have briey talked about points two and three in the context of demand and supply shocks but
we explore each of these aspects in detail below:
Table 8. The importance of factors driving price changes and lags of adjustment
Pakistan Euro Area
Manufacturing Services Overall
Inc. Dec. p-valuec Inc. Dec. p-valuec Inc. Dec.
Raw Material Cost 1.3 1.6 0.00 2.4 3 0.00 2 2
Energy Cost 2 2 0.00 2 2.7 0.00
Competitors Price 2 2 0.29 2.5 2.7 0.00 3 2
Exchange Rate 2 3 0.00 2.4 2.7 0.00
Demand Changes 3 2.5 0.00 3 3 0.00
General Price Level 3 3 0.53 3 3.4 0.00
Labor Cost 3 3 0.00 2 2.7 0.00 2 3
Financial Cost 3 3 0.00 3 3 0.00 3 3
Labor Productivity 3 3 0.75 3.5 3.7 0.00
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant respectively
b: asterik denote *incorporated within three months, **incorporated within six months, ***incor-
porated within nine months, **** incorporated within a year
c: Refers to null hypothesis that mean lag of price adjustment for a given factors for price
increase is equal to price decrease.
It is important to highlight that rms are more concerned with prices increases than reductions. Indeed,
median frequency of price decreases for manufacturing and services sectors rms over the last ve years prior
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to interview are 3 & 0 respectively. With this in mind, analysis on factors leading to price reductions should
be taken with a pinch of salt.
In Table 8, we report reasons which cause price changes and the approximate speeds with which these
changes pass-through to prices. The top four reasons for prices to go up or down for the manufacturing
sector are raw-material cost, energy cost, exchange rate movements and the competitors price. For the
services sector raw-material cost matters less while labor cost matters more due to their cost structure as we
shall explore shortly. In Table 8, we also report how quickly important changes are incorporated in prices
for these reasons. The top most important reason for a price change gets incorporated in decision-making
within a span of three months; a result we also found earlier but in a separate context. Other relatively
less important reasons are part of pricing-system within six months. In the case of the Euro area costs are
also more important but with the di¤erence that raw material and labor cost rank higher when prices go up
while raw-material costs and competitors price matter more when prices decrease. These di¤erences due to
focus on di¤erent costs can be explained by the nature of market and cost structures of the manufacturing
and service sector in Pakistan. We do not have equivalent speeds of adjustment available for other countries
for comparison.
Table 8 also tests the asymmetry of mean lag of prices changes for given reasons. We nd that for most of
the reasons it takes signicantly longer on average to markdown prices then markup except for few reasons
in manufacturing sector such as competitors price, general price level and labor productivity.
In Table 9, we present the breakdown of rmscost structure in 2009. We nd that local and imported
raw-material costs account for 60% of total cost, which explains the presence of exchange rate and local costs
as prime forces driving price changes.
Table 9. Percentage of Total Cost in 2009
Manufacturing Services Total
Local Raw Material Cost 56 17 38
Imported Raw Material Cost 13 6 10
Energy 13 12 12
Labor 11 39 24
Other 7 23 14
*Although done here, it is not advisable to club the
costs of two sectors based on their sector weights due
to these having a di¤erent cost structure.
Next we asked rms about the type of information they use when determining prices of their main
product. We focused on asking the extent to which price setting is based on information referring to past,
future or a combination of both past and future. This is important as it can shed light on the sources
of ination persistence from the point of view of businesses. According to Table 10, 53% of rms use a
combination of past and future information. Combining this information with rms using only historical
data, 81% of the rm use backward-looking information. Breaking up this gure in sectors, we nd that
72% and 86% rms in the manufacturing and services sector respectively use backward looking rules. The
predominance of backward-looking rules in our sample contrasts with that of Fabiani et al. (2007), where
the fraction of rms practicing backward-looking pricing relative to those making price decision on the basis
of forecasted data is the reverse of what we discovered in Pakistan.
Table 10. Information Type (% of Firms)
Manufacturing Services Total Euro Area
Historical Data 28 26 28 32
Forecast 25 14 19 55
An Average of Past and Future 47 60 53
These results on price determination have important policy implications. First, for an economy that
reprices at least 12.2% of its GDP (manufacturing sector) four-times-a-year and has lower responsiveness
to nancial costs compared to exchange rate, ination stabilization policies should pay more attention to
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exchange rate policy. This repricing reects the cost structure, where one-quarter of the inputs (imported
raw material and energy to some extent) have an exchange rate component. Second, frequent repricing by
rms may also be a reection of the lack of trust on the policy-makers to stabilize an economy that has gone
through an IMF programme no less than 11 times over the last two decades.
7. Linkages with the informal economy
An innovative part of our survey is that we ask rms about their existence in the formal sector and their
connections with the informal sector. Employment in the informal sector accounts for 70% of non-agriculture
labor force with 21% of these jobs belonging to manufacturing type activities. Meanwhile, formal sector
employment for the manufacturing sector is 20%. Given the size of the informal economy and its overarching
presence in the manufacturing sector, it is important to understand the linkages that might exist between
the product markets of formal and informal sector.
The literature on the informal sector is mostly concentrated on the labor market (see Perry et al. (2007)
for a comprehensive review). The literature reveals four dominant views on the existence of the informal
sector: (i) dualist view, which argues that informal sector is comprised of marginal activities Hart (1973),
(ii) structuralist view in Moser (1978) and Castells and Portes (1989), which says that rms in the informal
economy are subordinates to large enterprizes in the formal sector allowing the latter to cut costs and
improve competitiveness, (iii) legalist view of de Soto (1989 and 2000), which says that cost, time and e¤ort
of legislation is at the source of informal economy and (iv) voluntarist view, in which entrepreneurs make a
conscious decision to remain in the informal sector having done a cost-benet analysis.
These views lead to a variety of interplay between the formal and informal sector to explain labor market
issues in developing countries. We think that these theories are equally important for the product market
behavior but this connection remains ignored in the literature. The price-setting behavior in the formal
sector, and hence its consequences for ination and output, would be di¤erent for structuralist view as
opposed to dualist view. The structuralist view of informality allows formal sector to be more competitive,
whereas in the dualist approach the link between formal and informal sector is nonexistent.
Realizing the important role of the interplay between formal and informal sector in determining prices,
we asked formal rms in our interviews about their views on the existence of the informal sector. In addition,
we also asked them about the extent and nature of their interaction with rms in the informal sector. In
order to better understand the informal sector, our next step is to study price determination in the informal
economy by talking about prices with informal sector entrepreneurs; a task we take up in a forthcoming
paper.
In Table 11, we can see that top three reasons rms are operating in the formal sector are: (i) customer
preferences, (ii) economies of scale and (iii) market power. Surprisingly, seeking access to formal nancial
and overseas market appeared to be of little importance. The results by sector are similar.
Table 11. Why be part of the formal sector?
Manufacturing Services Total Importanceb
Customer Preferences 1.78 1.69 1.74 87%
Economies of Scale 1.66 1.98 1.79 87%
Market Power 2.10 2.23 2.16 74%
Favorable Government Policies 2.37 2.66 2.49 58%
Access to Bank Credit 2.56 2.43 2.51 64%
Access to International Market 2.99 2.87 2.94 43%
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
b: percentage of rm rating the factor as important or very important.
Similarly, we presented rms with a list of possible concerns that they face in the formal economy. We
also asked them if there were any concerns that were missing from our list. The mean scores are presented
in Table 12. The top three concerns for both the manufacturing and the services sector are: (i) product
standardization, (ii) costly entry and exit and (iii) discriminatory electricity charges.
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Table 12. Concerns with Staying in the Formal Sector (Mean Scoresa)
Manufacturing Service Total Importanceb
Product Standardization 1.80 2.24 2.00 77%
Entry-Exit is Costly 2.04 2.11 2.07 70%
Discriminatory Energy Charges 1.9 2.37 2.12 67%
Labor Regulations 2.08 2.57 2.31 66%
Employment and Old Age Benet Contributions 2.19 2.8 2.48 57%
Bureaucratic Hurdles 2.46 2.54 2.50 52%
Price Regulations 2.71 3.07 2.88 40%
Rental Charges 3.05 3.11 3.08 29%
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
b: percentage of rm rating the factor as important or very important.
We now move on to one of the most interesting part of the interview, where we asked rm owners about
their linkages with the informal sector. We nd in Table 13 that 58% and 34.3% of rms in the manufacturing
and services sector respectively interact with the informal economy. To put it in the aggregate context,
approximately half of rms that produce one quarter of Pakistans GDP are a¤ected through demand or
supply channels of the informal economy. Naturally, it is important to nd out the nature of this interaction.
There are three channels of interaction (i) demand channel in which informal rms compete for market share
with their formal counterpart, (ii) supply channel in which informal rms supply inputs to formal rms and
(iii) combination of (i) and (ii).
For the manufacturing sector 58% of rms are a¤ected by the informal sector through demand and
supply channels. The nature of interaction with informal sector is weaker for the services sector with only
34% of the rms reporting interaction with informal rms through demand and supply channels. The results
from the services sector are expected in that the informal sector may nd it tougher to reproduce intangible
goods being produced in the formal counterpart.
By looking at these results from the viewpoint of rm size reveals that medium-sized rms have the largest
interaction with the informal sector through demand and supply channels, whereas smaller and especially
larger rm are less interlinked. Juxtaposing this result with the nding on median frequency of price changes
in Table 5 one comes to the conclusion that medium sized rms, with strongest link to the informal sector,
are also the ones with lower frequency of price change  i.e a higher degree of price rigidity. Presumably,
such connections allow medium sized rms to delay price adjustment in response to cost shocks, which we
found earlier to be the prime culprit behind price adjustments.
Table 13. Linkages with the Informal Sector
Manufacturing Services Total Small Medium Large
No interaction 42 65.7 53.2 53.8 45.6 60
Demand Only 30.2 18.6 24.8 23.4 28.6 27.7
Supply Only 8.3 2.9 5.6 6.6 4.4 1.5
Demand and Supply 58 34.4 46.8 46.2 54.4 40
Market Share 29 36 32
Share in Total Cost 38 41 39
On the demand side, we nd in Table 13 that on average the market-share of the informal rms in the
manufacturing and services sectors is close to one-third. On the supply side, informal sector provides input
worth one-third of costs for all those rms using informal economy inputs. When we asked formal rms
about why they use the informal sector as a partner in their supply-chain, the top most reply was their
exibilityas input suppliers.
Finally, we asked rm owners to rank a list of reasons for the existence of the informal economy. The
scores are presented in Table 14. According to formal entrepreneurs the top four reasons for the existence
of informal sector are are lack of taxes, poor compliance (hence enforcement), simple production process and
costless entry and exit respectively for the manufacturing sector. For the services sector, the top two reasons
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are same but cheap labor ranked third. Surprisingly, the least important factor for the rms to exist in the
informal sector is lack of resources.
Table 14. Factors Contributing to the Existence of the Informal Economy (Mean Scoresa)
Manufacturing Services Total Importanceb
Lack of Taxes 1.58 1.59 1.59 90%
Tax Compliance/Enforcement 1.90 1.8 1.86 85%
Simple Production Process 1.93 2.22 2.03 74%
Costless Entry and Exit 1.99 2.11 2.03 75%
Low Labor Cost 2.09 1.98 2.05 72%
Corruption 2.02 2.41 2.15 69%
Lack of Resources 2.29 2.14 2.24 65%
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
b: percentage of rm rating the factor as important or very important.
Given the above results, one can conclude that according to formal rm owners, the informal sector
entrepreneurs are thriving both as producers and as input suppliers. This nding is especially relevant for the
manufacturing sector. Furthermore, formal rms with the highest interaction with the informal sector also
display greater degree of nominal price-rigidity. These preliminary results tend to support the structuralist
view of informality, the idea that there are input-output linkages between the formal and informal sector,
and the voluntarist view, the idea that entrepreneurs are choosing to stay out of formal sector, as possible
explanations for the existence of the informal economy. However, this can not be conclusive as the results
presented here only reect the view of formal rm owners about the informal sector. The robustness of
these ndings can only be conrmed with our forthcoming paper on price-setting in informal sector.
8. Caveats
Despite all the interesting results, this study is subject to many shortcomings. The main caveat of this
study is the services sector sampling frame. The frame for services sector was constructed using the SECP
database that lack information on number of employees and standard economic code classication. To rectify
this issue with the services sector frame, economic activities were selected after long process of scrutiny, but
still sample selected does not fully cover the services sector. Furthermore, frame construction method that
has been discussed earlier might also have introduced biases in the frame. By excluding rms that have not
reported in last ten years, we probably excluded many live rms. We thought it was necessary to minimize
the enormous cost, also it would not matter more if the missing services sector rms are distributed evenly
across di¤erent economic activities.
Similarly, selecting rms with paid up capital of more than 2,000,000 introduced a bias for larger services
sector rms. However, for a very small sample size reserved for services sector, it was not possible to make
statistically signicant inference for very large population of small rms anyways. Similarly, the frame
di¤erences also a¤ected the weighting scheme for services sector, we, therefore, reported most of the results
for manufacturing and secvices sectors separately.
Our Survey was carried out in only two out of four provinces of Pakistan, Balochistan and Khyber
Pakhtoon Khwa were excluded from our survey. The main reason for leaving out these two provinces were
security concerns at the time of survey. However, the contribution share of provinces in GDP give us hope
that this omission would not distort our results, since major share of the GDP is generated by two selected
provinces.
Our questionnaire addressed only few questions with reference to any specic year, most of the questions
were asked about general behavior without specication of time. However, we can not rule out the possibility
that questions were answered in the context of current higher ination environment prevailing in the country.
We have already mentioned that during the survey ination was 4-6 % above the average historical ination.
Panel survey in normal times can verify or reject the bias fear.
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During our survey, another group of researchers came up with a similar but restricted study. Malik, Satti
and Saghir (2010) conducted a survey for price setting behavior for four cities of the province of Punjab.
However, their study was di¤erent from us due to lack of national representation, no proper customization
and ignorance of informal economy. However, we take this study as a pilot for our survey in Punjab and nd
comparable results were consistent with Malik et al. (2010).
Another caveat of the study is the quality of enumerators, unlike Blinder (1991, 1998) who used economics
students for survey, we opted for enumerators from the provincial statistical agencies. Using economics
students gave Blinders study an additional advantage as all of the enumerators were fully aware of the
economics behind each question and had ability to explain clearly to respondents in case of any confusion.
The conceptual background of our enumerators was not very strong so we decided to train them extensively
for three days from theoretical framework to dummy exercises. However, we can not rule out the possibility
of any misunderstanding. We tried to address this this issue by sending our team with enumerators for 10
percent of the interviews. Also, rms were distributed randomly among all enumerators to avoid systematic
enumerator e¤ect in any particular economic sector.
Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that our results may capture the pricing mindset that prevailed
post 2008 balance-of-payments crisis in Pakistan. To minimize this concern, we asked rms about price-
setting behavior in general. Furthermore, questions for which we thought this concern was of particular
importance, we probed whether the reply would have been di¤erent in 2007 and 2008. We found there to
be little di¤erence between general and year-specic responses. As result, these results were not reported in
the paper. However, to eliminate all chances we aim to carry out this exercise sometime in the near future
when macroeconomic variables have somewhat steadied.
9. Conclusion
This paper is only a rst step towards understanding the price-setting behavior of the formal sector in
Pakistan. We describe preliminary results of 1086 structured interviews conducted for the manufacturing
and services sectors in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The sample for the manufacturing sector is fully
representative while the services sector, which is 10% of the total sample, is not representative. Together,
these sectors account for 71.4% of GDP in Pakistan. We nd that although imperfect competition is a
good representation of rms behavior, frequency of price changes are high enough to question the role of
nominal rigidities in explaining business cycle uctuations in Pakistan. This nding also raise the puzzle of
ination-persistencein Pakistan. The exchange rate is more important than nancial costs in price-setting
and generally cost shocks matter more than demand shocks. Most rms use backward-looking information
while making decision on prices. Also, majority of formal rms interact with rms in the informal sector,
however manufacturing sector have a higher level of interaction with the informal sector than the services
sector. Finally, formal rms with greater interaction with the informal economy tend to increase their prices
less frequently.
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10. Appendix A
Table 7B: Reason for Price Stickiness
Manufacturing Services
Theories Mean p- Imp.c Theories Mean p- Imp.c
Scoresa valueb Scoresa valueb
Coordination Failure 1.8 0.00 82 Coordination Failure 1.9 0.00 84
Temporary Shocks 2.5 0.04 55 Explicit Contracts 2.8 0.00 45
Risking Customer Rela-
tions
2.6 0.08 48 Risking Customer Rela-
tions
2.8 0.04 46
Procyclical Elasticities 2.7 0.17 43 Temporary Shocks 3.0 0.00 36
Habit Formation 2.8 0.21 40 Habit Formation 3.1 0.17 32
Constant Unit Cost 2.9 0.29 37 Procyclical Elasticities 3.2 0.00 29
Delivery Time 2.9 0.18 39 Thick Markets 3.4 0.00 23
Explicit Contracts 3.2 0.40 35 Constant Unit Cost 3.5 0.00 13
External Financing 3.1 0.44 34 Informal Sector Coordina-
tion Failure
3.5 0.17 15
Using Inventories 3.1 0.54 30 External Financing 3.6 0.00 16
Thick Markets 3.2 0.85 26 Implicit Contracts 3.6 0.00 12
Informal Sector Coordina-
tion Failure
3.2 0.00 29 Costly Information Gath-
ering
3.7 0.00 9
Implicit Contracts 3.4 0.00 23 Menu Costs 3.7 0.00 3
Costly Information Gath-
ering
3.6 0.00 11 Delivery Time 3.8 0.00 4
Menu Costs 3.7 8 Using Inventories 3.9 5
a: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
b: refers to the null hupothesis that theorys mean score is equal to the theory just ranked below.
c: percentage of rm rating the theory as important or very important.
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11. Appendix B
A1. How many products does your rm produce (or sell)? ________________________
A2. What is your "main product" in Pakistan? ______________________________
A3. In your total turnover/sales, what is the percentage of turnover/sales in Pakistan due to your "main
product? _______________%
A4. What is the most important market (in terms of turnover) for your "main product"? (Please circle
one option)
11. "Local market(city & surrounding areas)
12. "Nationalmarket
2. International market
A6. With reference to your "main product" and the Pakistani market, how would you rank your rm,
in terms of market share?
1. The top rm
2. One of the top 4 rms
3. One of the top 10 rms
4. Not among the top 10 rms
8. Do not know
A7. How would you characterize the degree of competition for your main product in the Pakistani
market? (Please circle one option)
1. Very tight
2. Tight
3. Medium
4. Weak
5. Very weak or no competition
8. Do not know
A8. In what percentage, the turnover generated by your "main product" is due to sales to? (There can
be more than one answer but the percentages should sum up to 100 percent)
1. Other rms ____________%
2. Through retailers/wholesalers ____________%
3. Through your own distribution network or through net-
work under your control
____________%
4. Direct sales to consumers including other channels such as
catalogues/internet/own shops
____________%
5. Government ____________%
Total = 100
A9. With reference to your "main product", what is the share of your regular customers (customers
with whom you have been doing business for more than one year) in di¤erent groups?
Long-term Customers
1. Other rms (including retail/wholesale sector): ____________%
2. Consumers (only for rms which sell their products directly to the public): ____________%
3. Government ____________%
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A12. With reference to your main product what was the cost structure of production in 2009?
1. Local raw material ____________%
2. Imported raw material ____________%
3. Energy ____________%
4. Labour ____________%
5. Other cost ____________%
Total = 100%
B2. How do you normally set the price of your main product? (Please circle one option)
1. We add a constant mark-up to the average variable production costs (cost of labour and cost of the
other inputs) and change the price when there is a change in cost (mark-up pricing)
2. Under normal circumstances, we use constant mark up. However, when the variable costs change to
such a large extent that they cannot be accommodated in price change, we change the mark-up
3. The market is very competitive; therefore we set our price in accordance with the market price level
4. The price is regulated administratively by the government
5. The price is regulated administratively by the associations
6. The price is negotiated mainly with our customers
B3. Do you base your pricing decisions on data from previous years or on forecasts?
1. Data from previous years
2. On forecasts
3. An average of past data and forecast
C1. We assume that companies review their prices from time to time, but they do not necessarily change
them. Do you review the price of your main product. . . . . . . . . .
1. Regularly?
2. On specic occasions (e.g. when costs change considerably)?
3. In general regularly and also on specic occasions (e.g. signicant changes in costs
or demand)?
4. We never review prices without the need to change them.
C2. You review the price of your main product regularly. At which intervals do you check the price?
1. Daily
2. Weekly
3. Monthly
4. Quarterly
5. Biannually
6. Yearly
7. Less frequently than yearly
D1. How often do you change the price of your main product on average in a year? ____________Times
E1. Which factors would increase the price of your "main product"? (Circle one option in each case)
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Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. An increase in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4
2. An increase in the cost of raw materials
(excl. energy)
1 2 3 4
3. An increase in energy prices 1 2 3 4
4. An increase in nancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4
5. A rise in demand 1 2 3 4
6. An increase in competitorsprices 1 2 3 4
7. An increase in overall cost of production 1 2 3 4
8. An increase in general price level 1 2 3 4
9. A decrease in competition 1 2 3 4
10. A decrease in labour productivity 1 2 3 4
11. A depreciation of PKR 1 2 3 4
E2. How quickly do you increase the price of your "main product" in response to the factors mentioned
below? (Circle one option in each case)
Within 1 Within 3 Within 6 Within 9 Within 1 No
Month Months Months Months Year Change
1. An increase in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. An increase in the cost of raw materi-
als (excl. energy)
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. An increase in energy prices 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. An increase in nancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. A rise in demand 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. An increase in competitorsprices 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. An increase in overall cost of produc-
tion
1 2 3 4 5 6
8. An increase in general price level 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. A decrease in competition 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. A decrease in labour productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. A depreciation of PKR 1 2 3 4 5 6
E3. Which factors would contribute to a decrease in the price of your "main product"? (Circle one
option in each case)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. A decrease in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4
2. A decrease in the cost of raw materials
(excl. energy)
1 2 3 4
3. A decrease in energy prices 1 2 3 4
4. A decrease in nancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4
5. A decrease in demand 1 2 3 4
6. A decrease in competitorsprices 1 2 3 4
7. A decrease in overall cost of production 1 2 3 4
8. A decrease in general price level 1 2 3 4
9. An increase in competition 1 2 3 4
10. An increase in labour productivity 1 2 3 4
11. An appreciation in PKR 1 2 3 4
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E4. How quickly do you decrease the price of your "main product" in response to the factors mentioned
below? (Circle one option in each case)
Within 1 Within 1 Within 1 Within 9 Within 1 No
Month Months Months Months Year Change
1. A decrease in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. A decrease in the cost of raw materials
(excl. energy)
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. A decrease in energy prices 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. A decrease in nancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. A decrease in demand 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. A decrease in competitorsprices 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. A decrease in overall cost of produc-
tion
1 2 3 4 5 6
8. A decrease in general price level 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. An increase in competition 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. An increase in labour productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. An appreciation in PKR 1 2 3 4 5 6
E5. Once you have decided that it is necessary to change the price upward of your main product,
which of the factors listed below might lead to a delay in the actual price change? (Please indicate their
importance in your rm to each answer by choosing one option per row)
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Theories Reasons for postponing price increase Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Firms watch what other rms will
do rst
1 2 3 4
2. Firms avoid price changes if they
perceive a shock (demand or sup-
ply) to be transitory
1 2 3 4
3. Customer might take the price
change as exploitative and antag-
onize
1 2 3 4
4. When times are good customers
become more price sensitive
1 2 3 4
5. When times are good share
of non-habitual customers with
higher price elasticities increases
1 2 3 4
6. When unit cost is constant, price
markups do not change
1 2 3 4
7. Prices are xed for a time interval
by contract
1 2 3 4
8. In good times external nancing
is cheaper allowing markups to be
constant
1 2 3 4
9. Firms vary delivery lags before
they make price adjustment
1 2 3 4
10. Firms vary inventories to avoid
price adjustments
1 2 3 4
11. In good times the ratio of re-
lationship costs to output sold
is lower allowing rms to keep
markups constant
1 2 3 4
12. Firms watch what competing
rms in the informal sector would
do
1 2 3 4
13. Firms have invisible agreement to
maintain prices at a certain level
1 2 3 4
14. Firms incur cost of acquiring in-
formation that would allow them
to adjust prices
1 2 3 4
15. Firms incur cost of adjusting
prices
1 2 3 4
F1. Nature of your interaction with the informal sector is that a substitutable product is produced in
the informal economy
1. Yes
2. No 2
F5. Nature of your interaction with the informal sector is that a fraction of intermediate good used in
production is purchased from the informal economy
1. Yes
2. No 2
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F6. The share in the total cost of the informal intermediate good(s) in the production of your main
product is: ______________ %
F9. What factors motivate you to stay in the formal economy? (Please circle one option)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Large scale production 1 2 3 4
2. Customers prefer to buy from registered producers 1 2 3 4
3. Favorable government policies 1 2 3 4
4. Access to bank and credit 1 2 3 4
5. Access to intl market 1 2 3 4
6. Market power 1 2 3 4
7. Other (please specify)_____________ 1 2 3 4
F10. What issues are associated with operating in the formal sector? (Please circle only one option in
each)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Contribution to EOBI 1 2 3 4
2. Labour regulations 1 2 3 4
3. Standardization of product 1 2 3 4
4. Land charges or rental value 1 2 3 4
5. Bureaucratic hurdles 1 2 3 4
6. Discriminatory energy charges 1 2 3 4
7. Entry-exit is costly 1 2 3 4
8. Price regulations 1 2 3 4
9. Other Specify________________ 1 2 3 4
F11. In your opinion what factors contribute to the existence of the informal sector? (Please circle only
one option in each)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Low labour cost 1 2 3 4
2. No taxes 1 2 3 4
3. Lack of resources (Physical capital, human capital) 1 2 3 4
4. Corruption 1 2 3 4
5. Non compliance of existing regulation 1 2 3 4
6. Cost less entry-exit 1 2 3 4
7. Simple production process 1 2 3 4
8. Other Specify __________________ 1 2 3 4
